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Digest: Manta Management Corp. v. City of San Bernardino 
Mike M. Khalilpour 
Opinion by Chin, J., expressing the unanimous view of the Court. 
Issue 
Can a city be liable under Title 42 of the United States Code section 
19831 for judicially enforcing a zoning ordinance by obtaining a stay and 
preliminary injunction where the stay is later dissolved and the ordinance 
under which the preliminary injunction is granted is later declared 
unconstitutional? 
Facts 
In 1994, Manta Management Corp. ("Manta") established a comedy 
nightclub in the city of San Bernardino ("the City").2 Shortly thereafter, 
Manta converted the club to an adult cabaret in violation of the City's 
ordinance limiting the location of adult businesses. 3 
The City sued Manta in state court seeking to enjoin the adult business 
as a public nuisance and as a violation of the City's zoning ordinance.4 
Manta contended that the ordinance violated the United States and 
California Constitutions "as applied" for being "unduly restrictive."5 The 
trial court found the zoning restrictions constitutional and granted the 
City's preliminary injunction, noting the City's likelihood of prevailing on 
the merits.6 Manta appealed and shortly thereafter filed a cross-complaint 
seeking monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("Section 
1983").7 
In 1996, the trial court dissolved the preliminary injunction and 
declared the City's ordinance an infringement of Manta's First Amendment 
right to speech "as applied."8 The City appealed and was granted its 
request to stay the injunction pending the appeal.9 The Court of Appeal 
I 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
2 Manta Mgmt. Corp. v. City of San Bernardino, 181 P.3d 159, 161 (Cal. 2008). 
3 /d. 
4 !d. at 162. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. 
233 
234 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 11:233 
dismissed Manta's appeal from the order granting the preliminary 
injunction. 10 In 1999, the Court of Appeal lifted its stay, and the California 
Supreme Court denied review. 11 
In 2000, the issue of the City's liability under Section 1983 was 
brought to the trial court, which ruled that the acts "precipitating the 
preliminary injunction and stay were an effort to enforce an 
unconstitutional zoning ordinance."12 The trial court held that such actions 
constituted a basis for Section 1983 liability; however, the court did not 
find the city's ordinance itself a basis for Section 1983 liability. 13 Manta 
was awarded $1.4 million in damages. 14 
The City appealed, contending that liability was improper under 
Section 1983, given that they had sought redress through the courts. 15 The 
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that "the city's act of obtaining an 
injunction to enforce an unconstitutional ordinance" violated the First 
Amendment within the meaning of Section 1983 and that a "city is liable 
for damages under section 1983 if it chooses to enforce an unconstitutional 
ordinance by means of a preliminary injunction."16 The Court of Appeal 
also held that "good faith" reliance on the trial court's issuance of the 
preliminary injunction would not provide immunity. 17 
Analysis 
The California Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Section 1983 
was to provide "compensation to those deprived of their federal rights by 
state actors"' but that it was "not itself a source of substantive rights, but 
merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere 
conferred."18 
The Court outlined the elements necessary for a prima facie showing 
to prevail on a Section 1983 claim for monetary damages: "(1) whether 
plaintiffs harm was caused by a [federal] constitutional violation, and (2) 
if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation." 19 The Court then 
continued to explain that liability depends namely upon "( 1) the rules 
governing culpability and responsibility, including principles of causation 
and the rule against respondeat superior liability; (2) whether individual or 
governmental liability is at issue; and (3) the available immunities from 
liability."20 The Court found relevant only the causation issue of how 
10 !d. 
II fd. 
12 !d. at 162-63 (internal quotations omitted). 
13 !d. at 163. 
14 !d. 
15 !d. 
16 !d. (internal quotations omitted). 
17 !d. 
18 !d. (internal quotations omitted). 
19 !d. at 163-64 (internal quotations omitted). 
20 !d. (internal quotations omitted). 
-
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related the City's acts or omissions were in bringing about the alleged 
injury.21 
The Court narrowly addressed the question of whether, assuming 
arguendo that Manta's First Amendment rights were violated, the "act of 
seeking an injunction to enforce" and the subsequent act of "filing a 
petition for writ of supersedeas to obtain a stay" caused harm.22 The Court 
quickly disposed of the immunity issue, as the City was not seeking 
immunity from liability but was contending that their acts of gaining the 
stay and preliminary injunction did not cause the alleged injury.23 
Relying on out-of-state and federal case law dealing with Section 
1983 litigation, as well as traditional tort concepts of causation, the Court 
agreed with other circuits.24 The Court agreed that, absent 
misrepresentation or pressure from the state actor, a court's exercise of 
"independent judgment" would break the causal link and be considered an 
intervening event, thereby preventing the first actor from being liable for 
harm which an "antecedent wrongful act was a substantial factor in 
bringing about. "25 
In viewing the causation principle in non-Section 1983 litigation, the 
Court noted that California appellate courts have found that the exercise of 
"independent judgment by a court constitutes an independent superseding 
cause."26 The only exception to the intervening cause principle was when 
the party seeking an injunction or stay pending an appeal "either misled or 
pressured the court. "27 
Holding 
The Court held that a court's intervening exercise of independent 
judgment breaks the chain of causation for purposes of Section 1983 
liability; however, material misrepresentations to the trial court would 
prevent the breaking ofthe chain ofcausation.28 
Legal Significance 
This decision extends traditional tort concepts of causation to the 
realities of Section 1983 litigation. This allows state actors to judicially 
enforce their laws in a good faith belief that they are constitutional and 
valid at the time. This decision also benefits potential plaintiffs by 
providing an exception to the traditional causation principles, when and if 
21 !d. 
22 !d. (italics omitted). 
23 !d. 
24 !d. at 164-66. 
25 !d. at 164-66. 
26 !d. at 166--67. 
27 !d. at 167. 
28 !d. 
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material misrepresentations and pressure are used by the state actors to 
achieve judicial enforcement. 
